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LIMITATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP
IN PENNSYLVANIA.
In view of the growth of public sentiment in this state in
favor of municipal ownership of street railways, water, gas and
electric light plants, a review of the powers of municipalities in
this regard as conferred by the Acts of Assembly, and as
defined by the Supreme Court, may be of service.
I. AS TO STREET PASSENGER RAILWAYS. There is no Act
of Assembly which confers upon any city or borough of this
commonwealth the power either to construct such a railway
or to purchase the lines of an existing company. Although
the power exists in the legislature, under Section 3 of Article
XVI of the Constitution, to take the property and franchises
of incorporated companies and subject them to public use, yet
it has never been exercised, with regard. to street railway
companies.
II. As TO WATER COMPANIES. The powers of municipalities
in this state to construct their own water works may be divided
into four classes :
(a.) The powers of cities of the first class. These appear to
be conferred by the Act of April i I, 1866, P. L. 635, author-
izing the city of Philadelphia to purchase and hold in fee
simple any springs of water or water privileges situated in any
one or more of the counties adjoining the city and county of
Philadelphia, and to construct thereon water works, reservoirs,
etc., for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of
the city; by the Act of March 22, x870, P. L. 513, author-
izing the city of Philadelphia to become the purchaser of the
franchises and property of any water company within its limits;
and by the further Act of April 10, 1873, P. L. 636, whereby
the city of Philadelphia is authorized to furnish water to the
residents of the township of Springfield in Montgomery
County. It is unnecessary to give in detail the extent to
which the city of Philadelphia has availed itself of the powers
conferred by these Acts; the only matter of interest connected
therewith being the power of the city to increase its indebted-
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ness by the issue of bonds for the purpose of further increas-
ing and improving its water supply, which question will be
referred to later on.
(b.) The powers of cities of the second class. These would
seem to be conferred by the Acts of March 7, 1843, P. L. 46 :
April 6, 1867, P. L. 851 ; May 15, 1871, P. L. 368; March
18, 1873, P. L. 302; May 2, 1879, P. L. 46 and May 25,
1887, P. L. 267. The first five of these Acts, in substance,
confer upon the city of Pittsburg (the city of Alleghany
having been a city of the third class until 1895, and therefore
coming under that category) the power to construct water
works, reservoirs and all necessary buildings and machinery
and to lay water pipes for the supply of the inhabitants of the
city; and also to contract with any neighboring city or
borough for supplying its inhabitants with water, and for that
purpose to appropriate water supplies within or without the
limits of the city, and also to take water from the Alleghany
or any other river for that purpose.
The Act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 267, further authorizes any
tity desiring to erect water works or improve its water supply,
to appropriate streams, lands, easements and rights of way,
whether within its territorial limits or not, and to lay pipes
therefrom across any lands, rivers, etc., upon payment of
proper compensation to property owners.
In so far as the powers conferred by these Acts have not
already been exercised they would in all probability, wherever
in conflict with exclusive rights confered upon private water
companies, come within the rule of the Supreme Court
defining similar powers of cities of the third class and
boroughs where the same conflict with the rights of private
water companies, which subject is discussed hereafter.
(c.) The powers of cities of the third class. These may
iagain be sub-divided:
I. Into those which were conferred and put into operation
by such cities while still boroughs, under the general borough
law of April 3, 1851, P. L. 320: or under their special char-
ters, an enumeration of which is unnecessary; and
1 2. Into those which were conferred by the Municipal Act
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of May 23, 1874, P. L. 23o, known as the "Wallace Law,"
the provisions of which were substantially re- enacted by the
Municipal Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 277, relating to cities
of the third class.
By these municipal Acts cities of the third class were given
the exclusive right at all times to supply each city and its
inhabitants with water, and for that purpose to either erect
and maintain the necessary works, machinery, etc., or to make
contracts. with any person or company for furnishing water for
any length of time not excecding ten years; and the further
power was also conferred of purchasing the plant of any water
company already in existence in such city, or adjacent thereto,
upon payment of the proper compensation.
These powers have recently been construed by the Supreme
Court in the case of White v. The City of .3eadville, 177 Pa.
643 (1895). This case arose as follows: The city of Mead-
ville under its special charter possessed the same power of
supplying water for the use of its inhabitants as was conferred
upon it when a borough, by the general borough law of 1851.
In 1874 the city contracted with the Meadville Water Com-
pany for a supply of water for a period of ten years with the
privilege of renewal for a further period of ten years. In 1891
the city accepted the provisions of the Act of May 23, 1874.
P. L. 230, known as the "Wallace Law," which acceptance
brought it also within the purview of the Act of May 23,
1889, P. L. 277, which is the Act under which cities of the
third class are now governed. In 1894 a municipal election
was ordered for the purpose of increasing the debt for
the construction of municipal water works. A bill in
equity was filed by citizens of Meadville to restrain the
construction of the water works. The Supreme Court,
after careful consideration of all the questions involved, de-
cided as follows:
a. That the Act of May 23, 1874, P. L. 23o, known as the
"Wallace Law," did not repeal the Act of April 29, 1874,
P. L. 73, known as the General Corporation Act, and there-
fore the city acquired no greater power under the." Wallace
Law" than it possessed under its prior charter.
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b. That the city having entered into a contract with the
water company and permitted it to lay its pipes, the municipal
function of supplying the city with water had passed from the
city, and that it could not subsequently erect its own water
works. That the legislature had conferred upon the munici-
pality the power to supply itself and its inhabitants with water
in two distinct ways; either by erecting its own plant or by
contracting with a private company, either of which methods
might be adopted, but that there was no grant of power to
put both methods in operation at the same time; and that
having elected to contract with the water company, such
company acquired contract rights which could not be abro-
gated at the will of the municipality.
c. That at the end of twenty years if the city desired to
supply its citizens with water it could do so, but only by pur-
chasing the works of the company in the mode pointed out
by the Act.
The effect of this decision is very sweeping, and although
there may be exceptions depending upon the particular facts
arising in some cities, yet there are very few cities of the third
class which have not heretofore exercised their power of
supplying water by contracting with a private water company,
and it would seem, therefore, that no such city has any longer
the right to erect its own plant without first purchasing the
plant of the existing company.
One feature of the Acts of 1874 and 1889, however, does
not seem to have been touched upon in this decision, namely,
that the power of the city to contract for a water supply is
limited to ten years. If the city cannot at the end of such
contract erect its own plant, and the twenty years have not
expired so as to enable it to purchase the plant of a private
company, then nothing remains for the city but to renew the
contract for another term of years, and perhaps if this feature
should hereafter be brought to the attention of the Supreme
Court it might modify its conclusions in the Meadville case;
although in the case of Wilson v. Rochester Borough, i8o Pa.
509 (1897), discussed hereafter, the contract between the
borough and the water company had already expired, and yet
LIMITATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP IN PENN'A. 159
the Supreme Court denied the right of the borough to construct
its own plant.
(d.) The powers of boroughs. These, with rare exceptions,
depending upon special charters, aie defined by the general
borough law of 185 1, P. L. 320, which authorizes boroughs
"to provide a supply of water for the use of the inhabitants,"
under which power boroughs may not only erect their own
water works, but contract with water companies for the supply
of water to the borough; and by the further Acts of April 16,
1875, P. L. 55 ; June IO, 1885, P. L. 81 ; and June 16, 189i,
P. L. 302.
The Act of 1875, as amended by the Act of 1891, author-
izes the levy of an additional tax for the purpose of erecting
and purchasing such fire plugs, hydrants, gas or electric
lamps, etc., as may be required to supply any borough with a
sufficient supply of water for public purposes, and for properly
lighting the streets, alleys, etc. (Section 2 of this Act, how-
ever, contains a proviso that before any borough shall exercise
any of the powers conferred thereby the Act shall be approved
of and accepted by the town council. Qiere, Does such pro-
viso bring the Act within the case of the Appeal of t/ City of
Scranton, 113 Pa. 176, as being local legislation forbidden by
Section 7 of Article III. of the Constitution ?)
The Act of 1885 authorizes boroughs to supply and make
contracts for "supplying water for ordinamy and domestic uses
to the inhabitants of a borough."
The Supreme Court has been called upon several times to
define the powers of boroughs to erect their own water works
under these Acts of Assembly, where such erection would
interfere with the exclusive privileges of private water com-
panies already in existence, and the decisions of that court
have dealt a severe b!ow at municipal ownership. These
decisions are as follows :
a. By the case of the Le/gh Water Co.'s Appeal, lO2 Pa.
515 (1883), it is apparently decided that the exclusive privilege
vested in any private water company is exclusive only as to
other private companies, and not as against municipalities;
but an examination of the facts of that case shows that in 1867
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the borough of Easton was authorized by a special Act of
Assembly to construct its own water works, provided a majority
of the qualified voters of the borough were in favor of such
construction. The Lehigh Water Company was incorporated
in 186o, succeeding to the rights of the Easton Water Company
and the West Ward Water Company. None of the Acts
relating to these companies conferred exclusive privileges upon
them, therefore the legislature had the right in 1867 to confer
upon the borough the right to construct its own water works,
and such special Act was not repealed by the Act of April 29,
1874, P. L. 73, known as the General Corporation Act. The
Lehigh Water Company therefore by accepting the exclusive
privileges conferred by the Act of April 29, 1874, on June 21,
188o, could not by such acceptance abrogate the rights vested
in the borough by the Act of 1867, although such rights were
not exercised until 1881. These facts are cited in the subse-
quent case of White v. City of Meadville, 177 Pa. 643, as
distinguishing the Lehigh case from the Meadville and other
cases.
b. In Howard's Appeal, 162 Pa. 374 (1894). it was held,
relying upon the Lehigh case, that the right of a borough to
erect water works was entirely independent of the right of private
corporations to erect similiar works. But this case is expressly
overruled in the case of White v. fffcadville, supra, where the
right of a private company under its contract with a munici-
pality was held to be a bar to the erection of water works by
such municipality.
c. In the case of The Gas and I Vater Company v. Downing-
/own, 175 Pa. 341 (1896), it was held that the legislature has
the power to take away the right of a borough under the
borough law of 185 I, to construct its own water works, and
may exercise such power by confcrring upon a private corpor-
ati(,, the power previously conferred upon the borough, and,
therefore. the Downingtown Water Company having by its
charter granted in I867, the exclusive privilege of supplying
the borough with water, such privilege could not be impaired
by the construction of a municipal plant.
d. In the case of J1ctfgcr v. Bcaver Fa!/s Borough, 178 Pa.
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S(1895), the Supreme Court went a step further, and held
that a water company organized under the General Corporation
Act of April 29, 1874, by which Act exclusive privileges were
conferred, and having a pending contract with the borough
to supply water for fire and other purposes, is entitled to the
exercise of such exclusive privileges until the expiration of
twenty years from the date of its charter, when the borough
would have the right to purchase its plant.
e. In the case of Wilson v. Rocrlester Borough, 18o Pa, 509
(1897), the contract between the water company and the
borough had apparently expired, yet the Supreme Court,
following the cases of White v. 4lfeqdville and Met-ger v.
Beaver Falls Borougfi, held that the borough of Rochester
must be enjoined from constructing its own water works.
It is to be observed further, in this case, that the charter of
the water company was granted after the Act of June 2, 1887,
P, L, 3 IQ, which confers exclusive privileges upon gas light
'companies only, and not upon water companies. It would
seem to follow, then, that the Supreme Court has taken the
broad position that a municipality has a right to supply itself
and its inhabitants with water in one of two ways, either by
erecting its own works, or by entering into a contract with a
private company; and that having adopted one or the other
of such methods it has exhausted its power in that regard
until such time as it can purchase the plant of the corporation
with which it has contracted.
III. As TO GAs COMPANIEs. The powers of municipalities
may here be sub-divided as in the case of water companies :
(a.) Cities of tlefirst rhass. The status of the gas works in
Philadelphia is a matter of such recent history that no discus-
sion of the same is needed. The abandonment by the city of
the control of its own gas works and the leasing thereof to a
private corporation is interesting as evincing a decided dissatis-
faction, not only on the part of the municipal authorities, but
of the public, with the system of municipal ownership, and the
weight of evidence as gathered from the published statements
from both sides would seem to be conclusive against the
possibility of municipal control at a profit.
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(b.) Cities of the second class. The city of Pittsburg, so far
as the City Digest shows, possesses no power to construct its
own gas works either for public or commercial lighting, which
functions have been exercised solely by private companies,
subject to inspection by the City Gas Inspector under the
provisions of the Act of April 28, 1869, P. L. 1242.
(c.) Cities of the third class. Their powers may be sub-
divided as in the case of water works into two classes:
I. Those in which the power to light the streets (no instance
having come to my knox% ledge of any such city having at-
tempted to furnish gas light to individuals) had been exercised
by such cities while boroughs, under the general borough law
of 185 1, or under the provisions of their special charters; and
2. Those conferred by the Act of May 23, 1874, P. L.
23o, and those conferred by the Act of May 23, 1889, P. L.
277, which gave to such cities the following powers:
a. To provide for and regulate the lighting of the streets
with gas, or electric lights, or light by other means;
b. To have the exclusive right at all times to supply the
city with gas or other light, and such persons and corpora-
tions therein as may desire the same;
c. And also to have at all times the unrestricted right to
erect and maintain the necessary buildings, machinery, etc.,
for that purpose;
d. To contract with any person or company for lighting the
city for a term not exceeding ten years;
e. To purchase, upon payment of proper compensation, the
plant of any gas or electric light company in such city or
adjacent thereto.
It would seem that wherever the privilege or franchise
vested in any existing gas company was exclusive under its
charter, whether special, or obtained under the General Cor-
poration Act of April 29, 1874, or wherever a city of the
third class may have entered into a contract with such gas
company for lighting its streets, the decisions of the Supreme
Court relative to the rights of water companies as laid down
in the above cited cases would apply, and that such city cannot
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erect its own gas plant until the expiration of twenty years
from the date of the charter of such company.
(d.) Boroughs. The powers of boroughs are derived either
from their special charters or from the general borough law
of 1851, as supplemented by the Act of April 16, 1875,
P. L. 55.
The Act of 1851 simply confers the power upon boroughs
to light the streets, and not to furnish the inhabitants with gas,
and the Act of 1875 likewise limits the application of the tax
thereby authorized to be levied to the lighting of the streets,
alleys, etc.
The cases above cited, relative to the powers of boroughs to
erect their own water works, would seem to apply with equal
force to the municipal ownership of gas plants where the
franchises of existing companies are exclusive, or where any
borough may have entered into a contract with an existing
company to light its streets, and, therefore, no borough can
erect its own plant without first purchasing the plant of the
existing company.
A distinction, however, may be drawn between the powers
of cities and boroughs to furnish water and to furnish gas,
to wit: The several Acts of Assembly, above mentioned,
authorize cities to "supply the city with water and such persons,
etc., as may desire the same," and authorize boroughs "to
provide a supply of water for the use of the inhabitants;" that
is to say: the supply of water for individuals is not separated
from the supply of water for public purposes. On the other
hand, the Acts of Assembly, above mentioned, relating to the
supply of light, authorize both cities and boroughs "to provide
for, and regulate the lighting of streets," or to "light the
streets;" and the Acts relating to cities confer by a separate
section "the exclusive right at all times to supply the city
with gas and such persons, etc., as may desire the same."
In other words, the public function is distinct from the private
function; and it may well be doubted whether the Supreme
Court would hold that a municipality had surrendered its
public duty by reason of its having entered into a contract
with a private company for lighting the streets only. For the
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purpose of this article it is sufficient to say, that no contest
has yet arisen upon this point between any municipality and
a private gas company, so that the question is still open.
IV. AS TO ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES. The powers of
municipalities in this regard may again be sub-divided as
before :
(a.) Cities of thefirst class. There appears to be no Act of
Assembly conferring upon cities of the first class the power
either to light its streets with electricity or to furnish electric
lighting to its inhabitants.
(b.) Cities of tle second class. The power to light its streets
with electricity or to furnish electric lighting for commercial
purposes appears thus far to have been withheld from cities of
this class as well as from cities of the first class. (The city of
Alleghany, now a city of the second class, established its own
electric light plant while a city of the third class.)
(c.) Cities of the third class. The powers of cities of the
third class in this regard are defined by the following Acts:
I. The Act of May 23, 1874, which authorizes such cities
"to provide for and regulate the lighting of the streets and
the erection of lamp posts." (If this were the only power
conferred it might be questioned whether it included the power
to light the streets by electricity, which method was unknown
at the time of the passage of the Act.)
2. The Act of May 23, 1889, which confers the following
powers:
a. To provide for and regulate the lighting of the streets
with gas or electric lights or light by other means.
b. To have the exclusive right at all times to supply the
city with gas or other light, and such persons or corporations
therein as may desire the same.
c. And also to have at .all times the unrestricted right to
erect and maintain the necessary buildings, machinery, etc.,
for that purpose.
d. To contract with any person or company for lighting the
city for a term not exceeding ten years.
e. To purchase upon payment of proper compensation the
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plant of any gas or electric light company in such city or
adjacent thereto.
Although no exclusive privilege has ever been conferred
upon any electric light company, it would seem, nevertheless,
under the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of
White v. Meadville, fetager v. Beaver Falls Borough1, and
Wilson v. Rochester Borough, above referred to, that wherever
a city of the third class may have entered into a contract with
an electric light company it cannot erect its own electric light
plant without first purchasing the plant of such company.
The same distinction, however, suggested above as to the
powers of municipalities with regard to the furnishing of water
and the furnishing of gas may very properly be insisted upon
with reference to their powers to erect their own electric light
plants for street purposes. That is to say, the Act of 1889
above referred to seems to separate the function of lighting
the streets from the function of supplying electric light for
commercial purposes, and therefore no city should be deprived
of its right to erect its own plant for the purpose of lighting
its streets by reason of the fact of its having contracted with
a private company for that purpose for a term of five or ten
years as authorized by said Act.
(d) Borougls. The powers of boroughs with regard to
electric lighting are conferred by the following Acts:
a. By the Act of June 16, 189I, P. L. 302, the power to
levy a lighting tax, which, by the Act. of April 16, 1875,
P. L. 55, was confined to a gas tax, is extended to the sup-
plying of boroughs with electric light or other illuminant
for the purpose of properly lighting the streets, etc., of the
borough.
b. The Act of May 20, 189i, P. L. 9o, confers upon all
boroughs the right to manufacture electricity for commercial
purposes for the supply and use of the inhabitants of said
boroughs, provided that in all boroughs so desiring to furnish
electric lights, where electric light companies already organized
are furnishing electric lights to said borough or the public,
the borough shall endeavor to purchase the works of such
corporation at a price to be agreed upon or fixed by viewers;
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and section three of said Act extends its provisions to all
boroughs which had theretofore erected their own electric
light plants.
Although no case has arisen, so far as I am able to find,
defining the powers of boroughs under this Act, yet in view
of the tenor of the decisions of the Supreme Court above
referred to relating to municipal water works, it may fairly be
argued that no borough may erect an electric light plant for
commercial purposes without first purchasing the plant of the
existing corporation to which it may have given permission to
occupy its streets, especially where it may have entered into a
contract with such corporation for lighting its streets. Here
again, however, the distinction between the public function of
lighting its streets and the private function of furnishing electric
light for commercial purposes may perhaps be valid. If so,
any borough under the powers conferred by the borough law
of 1851 and the Act of April I6, 1875, P. L. 55, as amended
by the Act of June 16, I89I, P. L. 302, may erect its own
electric light plant for the purpose of lighting, its streets
without first purchasing the plant of the private corporation.
V. The powers above set forth are subject to a further and
a very important limitation, viz. : that of ways and means.
As no municipality can expend more in any one year than its
current revenues will provide, which revenues cannot, except
in rare instances, exceed three per centum of the assessed
valuation of property subject to taxation, it follows that the
expenditure required for the installation of either water works
or a light plant, must be provided for by an increase of the
indebtedness of the municipality.
The Constitution of 1874, Article IX., Section 8, provides
as follows: " The debt of any county, city, borough, township,
school district, or other municipality or incorporated district,
except as herein provided, shall never exceed seven per
centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property
therein, nor shall any such municipality or district incur any
new debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding
two per centum upon such assessed valuation of property,
without the assent of the electors thereof at a public election
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i 1 such manner as shall be provided by law; but any city, the
debt of which now exceeds seven per centum of such assessed
valuation, may be authorized by law to increase the same
three per centum, in the aggregate, at any one time, upon
such valuation,"
It is apparent at a glance that two classes of municipalities
are here provided for;
I, Those whose debt at the adoption of the Constitution
was less than seven per centum of their assessed valuation; and
2, Those cities whose debt at that time exceeded seven per
centum of their assessed valuation,
In pursuance of this classification the legislature has passed
Acts of Assembly appropriate to each class, Those relating
to the first class are :
a, The Act of April 20, 1874, P. L. 65, whieh provides;
I. For the increase of indebtedness by anymunicipality whose
debt is less than two per centum of its valuation by a majority
vote of its council or councils, subject to certain regulations as
to notice of the intended increase, and provided that at the
time of increasing the debt the ordinance shall provide for the
levy of a tax equal to eight per centum of such increase.
In construing this portion of the Act the Supreme Court
has several times decided that the two per centum limit applies
to existing as well as new indebtedness, that is to say, if
the proposed increase added to the existing indebtedness will
exceed two per centum of the assessed valuation, then the
municipal councils have no power to incur such increase; in
other words, councils can only incur an indebtedness which,
added to the existing indebtedness, will be less than two
per centum.
2. For the increase, up to seven per centum, of the indebt-
edness of any municipality by an electoral vote (subject to the
prescribed regulations as to notice of the intended increase)
where the existing indebtedness already exceeds two per
centum of the assessed valuation, or where the proposed
increase added to the existing indebtedness will exceed such
two per centum. In such cases, also, an annual tax equal to
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eight per centum of the proposed increase must be provided
for by the ordinance authorizing such increase.
b. The Act of June 9, I89i, P. L. 252, amends the Act of
April 2o, 1874, by requiring the purpose and amount of the
increase to be stated upon the election tickets.
c. The Act of April 18, 1895, P. L. 36, amends the fourth
section of the Act of April 20, 1874, by omitting the clause in
the original Act relating to the requirements as to notice,
publication, etc., and by further omitting the requirement that
the tax levied shall be at least eight per centum of the increase.
Under this Act the Supreme Court, in the case of Sener v.
Euphrata Borough, 176 Pa. 80 (1896), decided that the
omission of the clause relating to the requirements as to
notice, etc., was not accidental, and that, as the amendment
reads, no municipality could increase its indebtedness at any
one time at any one election to an amount exceeding two per
centum of the assessed valuation.
d. This construction of the Act of 1895 was so decidedly
at variance with the letter and spirit of the constitutional
provision above quoted, and of the Act of April 20, 1874,
that the legislature at its next session, by the Act of
May II, 1897, P. L. 53, restored the clause relating to
the requirements as to notice, etc., and expressly authorized
an increase at an election to an amount not exceeding seven
per centum of the assessed valuation, including existing
indebtedness.
e. The Act of April 13, 1897, P. L. 17, amends the second
section of the Act of April 20, 1874, by omitting the require-
ment that the tax shall be equal to eight per centum of the
amount of the increase, so that at the present time, whether
the debt be increased by vote of councils, or by electoral vote,
the amount of the tax to be levied need only be sufficient for
the payment of the interest and principal of the increase within
thirty years from the date of the increase.
The Acts of the Assembly relating to the second class, con-
templated by the constitution, are limited to cities of the first
and third classes, which apparently are the only munici-
palities whose debts at the adoption of the constitution
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exceeded seven per centum of their assessed valuation, and
are as follows:
a. By Section I I of the Act of May 23, 1874, councils of
any city of the first class, whose debt exceeded seven per
centum upon its assessed valuation, were authorized to
increase such debt one per centum of such valuation, subject
to certain regulations therein prescribed relating to notice of
the proposed increase, and providing for the levy of an annual
tax sufficient to pay the principal and interest of the debt
within thirty years.
b. By the Act of June II, 1879, P. L. 137, councils of
cities of the first class were authorized to fund their floating
indebtedness to the extent of ten million dollars, provided such
loan should not exceed two per centum upon the assessed
valuation of the taxable property of such cities.
The Supreme Court has three times passed upon the powers
conferred by these Acts. The cases are as follows: Wheeler
v. Phziladelphia, 77 Pa. 338 (1875), decided that the city
of Philadelphia had the right under Section I I of the Act
of 1874, above mentioned, to increase its indebtedness without
any electoral vote to an amount not exceeding one per centum
of its assessed valuation; Brooke v. Philadelphia, 62 Pa. 123
(1894), decided that in ascertaining the existing amount
of indebtedness at any one time the amount already paid,
or provided for in the sinking fund, should be deducted
from the gross indebtedness, and that the debt might
still be increased to the statutory limit ; Pepper v. Philadelphia,
I81 Pa. 566 (1897), decided that inasmuch as the net
indebtedness of the city of Philadelphia, after deducting
from the gross indebtedness the amount provided for by the
sinking fund, had fallen below seven per centum of the
assessed valuation, therefore the city of Philadelphia is now in
the same category with municipalities whose debt at the
adoption of the constitution was less than seven per centum of
their assessed valuation, and that no further increase of its
indebtedness can be incurred without an electoral vote in the
manner prescribed by the Act of April 20, 1874, and its several
amendments above referred to.
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The practical effect of this last decision has been to retard
the proposed loan for the improvement of the Philadelphia
water works and other purposes.
c. By section 59 of the Act of May 23, 1874, cities of the
third class, whose debt at the adoption of the constitution
exceeded seven per centum of their assessed valuation, were
authorized to increase their indebtedness by vote of councils
to an amount not exceeding three per centum of such assessed
valuation, provided that such increase be made in the manner,
and after the notice, and in accordance with every requirement
necessary for the increase of indebtedness of cities of the first
class under section I I of said Act.
The Act of May 23, 1889, which now regulates the govern-
ment of cities of the third class amends the Act of 1874 by
requiring a two-thirds vote of councils for such increase of
indebtedness.
Two or three cases have been decided by the Supreme
Court construing the powers of cities of third class to increase
their indebtedness, but have been confined rather to the question
as to whether the contract proposed to be entered into would,
or would not increase the indebtedness of the city: Erie City's
Appeal, 91 Pa. 403 (1879); Black v. Chester, 175 Pa. 1oi
(1896); and Brown v. Corry, 175 Pa. 528 (1896).
The two cases 'of Brooke v. Philadelphia, and Pepper v.
Philadelphia, apply with equal force to cities of the third class.
The questions, therefore, which every municipality desiring
to establish a municipal plant for water or light must deter-
mine, are, according to the category within which such
municipality falls :
I. Will the proposed increase raise the indebtedness above
two per centum of the assessed valuation ?
2. Will the proposed increase raise the indebtedness above
seven per centum of the assessed valuation ?
3. Will the proposed increase, added to prior increases
exceed three per centum in the aggregate upon the assessed
valuation?
From the foregoing review of the Acts of Assembly and the
decisions of the Supreme Court it will be seen that the powers
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of municipalities in this state to erect their own plants, whether
for water or for light, are much more limited than is popularly
supposed, and that those municipalities which have already
availed themselves of their powers in this regard, and are
satisfied with the workings of their plants, are to be congratu-
lated on having anticipated the decisions of the Supreme Court
referred to in the earlier part of this article.
William D. Crocker.
City Solicitor,
Williamsport, Pa.
